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ABSTRACT   African countries such as South Africa, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Liberia, 
Ghana, and Nigeria share post-conflict policies known as transitional justice (TJ) to achieve 
accountability for conflicts, victimhood, and wrongdoing. This paper provides an assessment 
of the previous critical discourse on TJ, identifies the issues critics have focused on, examines 
why the assessments of TJ programs have been critical, and discusses whether the criticisms 
reflect essential conditions under which the TJ programs were conducted. The paper also 
examines the criticisms of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa 
and traces the development of similar criticism aimed at Sierra Leonean and Rwandan 
programs. In so doing, it attempts to uncover the social conditions that affect TJ outcomes 
and induce repetitive choruses of criticisms. Finally, the author introduces a sociological 
framework based primarily on social movement theory to explore the contributions and 
potential of TJ for post-conflict societies.
Key Words: Transitional justice; Social movement; Mobilization; Post-conflict society; 
Double contingency.
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, the African continent has been the focus of 
international attention because of frequent armed conflicts and its unique and 
progressive post-conflict policies. Countries such as South Africa, Sierra Leone, 
Rwanda, Liberia, Ghana, and Nigeria share post-conflict policies known as 
transitional justice (TJ) that attempt to achieve accountability for conflicts, 
victimhood, and wrongdoing. 
The definition of TJ differs among scholars. Some describe TJ as “trials, truth 
commissions, vetting, institutional reform, security sector reform, and 
reparations.”(1) Ruti Teitel, a leading scholar in this field, defined TJ as “the 
conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized 
by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes” 
(Teitel, 2003: 69). This definition excludes the truth commission. On the other 
hand, a 2004 United Nations (UN) report defined TJ, including the truth 
commission, as:
Full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts 
to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to 
ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation. These may 
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include judicial and non-judicial mechanisms with differing levels of 
international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, 
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a 
combination thereof (United Nations Security Council, 2004).
However, a theoretical argument related to the definition of TJ is not the focus 
of the present article. Hence, the conventionally accepted UN definition of TJ 
will be used in the following sections. 
As the number of TJ programs has increased, so too have critical comments 
and analyses of TJ. For instance, since the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) completed its work, most scholarly evaluations of the 
commission have been critical. However, this negative tendency has not been 
restricted to research on South African programs. 
A negative report on the Serbian transition stated that “Today, eight years on, 
we witness the failure of this transition” (Dimitrijevic, 2008: 11). Similarly, the 
Nigerian program has been described as “fundamentally flawed from the outset 
by a deliberate ploy on the part of the government” (Yusuf, 2007: 269). In Sri 
Lanka, several attempts by post-war governmental commissions to disseminate 
the findings of their inquiries have failed because of internal political conflict. 
As a result, the nation has become indifferent to the inquiries (Anonymous, 
2011: 39). One scholar lamented that no previous TJ program has achieved its 
goals:
... [W]e have focused entirely too much on the notions of closure and 
reconciliation. Member states of the UN and European Union have expended 
considerable amounts of money and human resources on chasing a will-
o’-the-wisp, adopting buzzwords that have no consistent definition or 
conceptual clarity and promoting mechanisms to achieve these obscure 
outcomes with little evidence that they will make a difference (Weinstein, 
2011: 3).
In another study, the author wondered, “Whether there is anything we can do 
to lessen the disappointments and frustrations that often result from our attempts 
to pursue transitional justice” (McAdams, 2011), echoing these critical choruses. 
Reviewing the preceding works on TJ gives this author the sense as if TJ is 
destined to be criticized as failure by scholars or locals of the concerned society. 
But why? Do such critical discourses on the previous TJs have any blind spot 
in terms of the social context in which TJs are inevitably or alternatively settled?
This paper begins with an assessment of previous critical discourse on TJ. It 
identifies the issues critics have focused on, examines why the assessments of 
TJ programs have been critical, and discusses whether the criticisms reflect 
essential conditions under which the TJ programs were conducted. The following 
section examines the criticisms of the TRC in South Africa and traces the 
development of similar criticism aimed at Sierra Leonean and Rwandan programs. 
Then, this paper examines the societal conditions in which these TJ programs 
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were conducted. In so doing, it attempts to uncover the social conditions that 
affect TJ outcomes and induce repetitive choruses of criticisms. Finally, the 
author uses the sociological framework based primarily on social movement 
theory to explore the contributions and potential of TJ from a new angle.
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ON SOUTH AFRICAN AND OTHER AFRICAN TJ 
PROGRAMS
I. Criticism of South African Cases
The post-apartheid South African government chose to establish the TRC 
rather than a war tribunal or providing full immunity to perpetrators of past 
atrocities. The primary mandate of the TRC was to gather testimony from a 
wide variety of victims and perpetrators, hold public hearings(2) of selected cases, 
examine applications by former perpetrators for amnesty, recommend desirable 
means of reparation for victims,(3) and to edit and publish an official report. 
Based on the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, the 
TRC commenced nationwide public hearings in April 1996, gathered testimony 
from 22,000 victims, accepted amnesty applications from 7,100 former 
perpetrators, and published a five-volume interim report in 1998 (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 1998). Reviews of amnesty applications continued 
until 2000, and the final two reports were published in March 2003. Although 
more than 10 years have passed since the TRC completed its work, a variety 
of criticisms of the TRC have appeared. A rough overview of these criticisms 
is provided below.
Several scholarly assessments of the TRC favorably evaluated the clause that 
permitted the provision of amnesty in exchange for full-range testimonies and 
widely organized public hearings. These elements were significant in comparison 
with similar attempts made in other countries, such as El Salvador, in which 
army officers responsible for atrocities were offered immunity in exchange for 
the publication of official reports (Hayner, 2001: 40). In the case of truth 
commission of Sri Lanka, public hearings had to end because witnesses received 
threats (Hayner, 2001: 74).
Although expectations were high in the early stages of the program, the TRC 
was criticized for a variety of reasons during the course of its activities, some 
of which were directed at the image expected of the TRC. Several of the 
criticisms addressed shortcomings of the mandate and the commission’s inability 
to involve the perspectives of all citizens.
With respect to the framework of the TRC process, Mahmood Mamdani’s 
criticism (Mamdani, 2009) of the responsibility of the beneficiaries is crucial. 
Mamdani focused on the definition of “perpetration” during the TRC. He argued 
that only actual criminal deeds were addressed and the systematic perpetration 
of the apartheid regime was ignored (Mamdani, 2009: 472–473). Similarly, 
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Carranza (2008) noted that the TRC could not address the corruption that occurred 
during the apartheid era simply because “corruption fell outside its mandate” 
(Carranza, 2008: 313). Undoubtedly, most types of corruption involved white 
public service personnel, thus showing impunity of beneficiaries.
Criticism of the political discourse during the public hearings stemmed from 
the TRC commissioners’ concluding remarks when victims finished their 
testimonies, “Your hardship was necessary to give birth to the new South Africa,” 
perceived as negative by individuals who did not believe that their experiences 
should be integrated into the nationalistic “master narrative” (Chidester, 1999). 
This criticism highlights the impact of the exclusive discourse on victims who 
did not identify victimhood with the rise of the new nation. Consistent with the 
narrow limits of the mandate, the victim category was criticized because it did 
not include violations of the past laws. A mandate omitting such a point was 
deemed to have failed to address widespread basic violations of human rights 
by the institution of apartheid.
Although the victim-centered orientation of the TRC framework was a positive 
aspect of the program, victims generally only had the opportunity to testify once, 
and the witnesses selected for the public hearings did not receive sufficient 
psychological care. Thus, it is doubtful that the opportunity to testify led to 
psychological healing. Worse, the lack of sufficient attention or follow-up 
mechanisms has been found to trigger re-traumatization in witnesses.(4) At the 
collective level, this phenomenon has been expressed as the post circus syndrome:
... Lapsley saw that the hearings often left the townspeople at a loss; “The 
circus comes to town and the circus leaves—and then what?” they would 
ask him (Hayner, 2001: 142). 
Furthermore, a number of criticisms arose from the statistical data on testimonies 
collected by the commission. Foremost among them was the concern that the 
statements were not collected equally among population groups. There was little 
doubt that the TRC collected many statements from Africans, particularly those 
who supported the African National Congress (ANC). This issue was statistically 
borne out in the TRC report (Table 1). 
In fact, even the ANC failed to maintain a unified position with regard to the 
TRC. Politicians such as Thabo Mbeki, who were younger than some others, 
including the then-president Nelson Mandela, adopted adversarial positions that 
demanded the deletion of certain ANC past activities from the official report. 
Furthermore, they boycotted the ceremony for the publication of the TRC report 
in October 1998. Later, when Mbeki assumed political power, he did not 
implement the recommended reparation policies suggested by the TRC. 
Conversely, the white nationalists and supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) refused to commit to the TRC process because they believed its activities 
were politically biased. Nor did the process involve many individuals who were 
perpetrators in the black on black violence in the 1990s, during the last stages 
of the apartheid regime. Moreover, the TRC was further criticized for not 
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summoning the ex-president of the apartheid era, P. W. Botha. These facts were 
considered failures of the TRC.
Other critics have observed that several South African non-government 
organizations (NGOs), including churches, offer a good foundation for local 
cooperation and criticized the TRC for not mobilizing local stakeholders and 
developing close relationships and lasting cooperation with these local NGOs 
(van der Merwe, 2003: 110–112; van der Merwe & Chapman, 2008). With 
respect to individuals who may have been involved, some critics questioned the 
concept of reconciliation solely in the national context (Mine, 2010). Conflicts 
during apartheid did not occur solely within South African borders. Rather, these 
conflicts also occurred in neighboring countries, and individuals residing in those 
countries did not consider apartheid just another country’s business; apartheid 
was a matter in which they were directly involved as stakeholders. In this 
context, the TRC, which failed to address victimhood in neighboring countries, 
was criticized for not including the ideal of liberation and, as a result, missing 
an opportunity to improve relationships with these countries.
By highlighting the shortcomings of the process, these criticisms reveal that 
the TRC failed to reach and include many individuals and organizations. In other 
words, these criticisms clearly indicate that the TRC should have attempted to 
develop a mechanism by which the maximum number of people interested in 
the work of the commission could have joined the process on their own initiative.
II. Criticisms of Other African TJs: Cases in Sierra Leone and Rwanda
The criticism that the South African TRC failed to capture the interest and 
promote the participation of local people and organizations was echoed in the 
Sierra Leone cases. The hybrid Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the 
Sierra Leonean TRC were criticized for failing to correspond to local values 
and worldviews.
For example, Rosalind Shaw noted from her interviews with locals that more 
people were focused on the importance of forgetting than on the merits of 
speaking the truth:
Table 1. Number of statements collected from each population group
Population group Number of statements Statements from each group (%) Total population in each group (%)
  African 19,144  89.9  76.1
  Colored      354    1.7    8.5
  Asian        45    0.2    2.6
  White      231    1.1   12.8
  Total* 21,297 100.0 100.0
Source: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: 168.
 *1,523 statements were from deponents whose population group was unknown; thus, the total number 
differs from the sum of each population group.
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Instead of the expectation of “forgive and forget,” which normally 
accompanies the truth-telling project, they argued that healing and 
reconciliation depend on forgetting. [Therefore, i]n some communities, 
survivors and witnesses of the violence agreed together that they would 
not give statements telling of what they had suffered during the war (Shaw, 
2007: 184). 
Shaw described the negative reaction of the locals to the TRC as follows: 
The TRC is too public. I have forgotten and have forgiven, so no need 
for the TRC. … We don’t want the TRC because the TRC is only word 
of mouth. But if you will give me what I’ve lost, then the TRC will hold 
water. How will I go and talk on the radio about what they’ve done to 
me, when I get no [material] benefit from that? I’ll feel shame. I don’t 
want to let the public know what they’ve done to me. We all decided not 
to talk to them. The president talked to us—“forgive and forget.” Then 
they [the TRC] said they come to take statements, but no [material] ben-
efit! We discussed this before they came. We decided to avoid them. When 
you talk about what happened, you feel worse, not better (Shaw, 2007: 
198). 
These negative reactions to the TRC revealed that the locals clearly disagreed 
with the TRC framework. They did not believe that public retelling of traumatic 
experiences helped them achieve healing and reconciliation. In other words, the 
basic methodology and value system of the TRC did not reflect the local value 
system and, thus, failed to match the locals’ sense of justice and reconciliation. 
Criticisms similar to those of the TRC are reflected in the following quotation 
drawn from the SCSL case: 
… US involvement in the SCSL and the Taylor trial was particularly 
damaging to the legitimacy of the process because the SCSL could with 
some credibility be portrayed as the Americans’ plaything, with American 
funding and American prosecutors leveling “American accusations of 
terrorism” (Glasius & Meijersy, 2012: 251).
The lack of sufficient local involvement in the process lead to the criticism 
that the TRC was “foreigners’ games.”
Distrust in foreign experts is usually paralleled by local expectations that may 
make the foreign experts feel uncomfortable. As demonstrated by Shaw’s 
description, when locals hear the foreigners state, “We want to help you,” locals 
may think fiscal opportunities will be provided.(5) Thus, when locals realize they 
may not receive remuneration for their participation, their motivation to take 
part in the TRC process is likely to decrease. Also, “the TRC and the SCSL 
failed to reach out to and include the majority of Sierra Leoneans” (Iliff, 2012: 
261–262), who lived in rural areas and were illiterate. The local people were 
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unable to follow the operation of the two institutions in newspapers and media 
reports. The failure to popularize the TRC process, in particular, was exacerbated 
by the Commission’s failure to rebroadcast its hearings in popular media (Iliff, 
2012).
Iliff focused on the work and role of Fambul Tok, a local NGO led by a 
former TRC staff member, which was to promote dialogue and reconciliation at 
the community level to achieve “total community participation” (Iliff, 2012: 
264). Undoubtedly, “total community participation” is a concept that the TRC 
was unable to embody, even though that was the direction it was expected to 
take.
Although local participation is an essential factor for TJ, the Rwandan case 
described below reveals the drawbacks of the “total community participation” 
ideal. The Rwandan gacaca, originally meaning to sit down and discuss an issue 
at the community level, was applied by the Rwandan government to deal with 
the past atrocities in an alternate local judiciary system. It is a well-known 
example of using a local “traditional” mechanism to achieve conflict resolution 
on a mass level that has been widely described in TJ studies. However, qualitative 
studies that focused on the actual gacaca process revealed difficulty in drawing 
local individuals into the conflict resolution process. Thomson & Nagy (2011) 
reported the negative comments of locals with regard to becoming involved in 
gacaca: 
... [A] Hutu peasant and former prisoner ... said “Gacaca is just for show. 
We are told how to tell our truth about what we did during the genocide 
at gacaca. Me, I killed, and I even went through ingando [citizenship 
reeducation camps]. I have done everything this new government told me 
to do to get reconciled (Thomson & Nagy, 2011: 22). 
Biased participation standards were also reported by Human Rights Watch:
Hutu often stayed away from gacaca, afraid of being publicly denounced 
or concerned they might not be given an opportunity to defend themselves. 
... Hutu whose relatives were killed and had property destroyed by RPF 
soldiers were unable to raise these cases, which left them frustrated and 
disappointed with the process (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 84).
Even when the participation of locals was relatively consistent, external and 
internal control of the testimonies prevented locals from speaking the truth:
Both genocide survivors and genocide perpetrators worried that speaking 
about what they knew in gacaca would lead to social ostracism or 
repercussions from relatives and neighbors or would create problems with 
local government officials. As a result, the practice of “ceceka” (meaning 
“to keep silent”) emerged, with local residents attending gacaca but 
deliberately choosing not to speak (Human Rights Watch 2011: 84–85). 
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Furthermore, as locals lost interest in the gacaca process, local officials and 
judges reportedly made forceful attempts to gather audiences: 
When persuasion [to come to gacaca] failed, they closed shops on the 
day of gacaca hearings and threatened to fine residents who failed to 
attend the sessions. One individual told Human Rights Watch that fines 
ranged from 1,000 to 2,000 Rwandan francs (up to 3.30 USD). In certain 
areas, the local defense forces went house to house, rounding up community 
members and bringing them to gacaca. Gacaca judges occasionally used 
local defense forces to prevent people from leaving gacaca sessions early 
(Human Rights Watch, 2011: 85).
Thus, the issue of participation cannot be measured solely by the number of 
participants involved in the process, despite the fact that participation is the 
primary factor used to infer the social effectiveness of TJ program. As 
demonstrated by the Rwandan case, the number of locals involved and the 
manner in which they were involved are crucial to the success of TJ programs. 
III. A Common Motive of These Criticisms
The South African, Sierra Leonean, and Rwandan cases share certain 
shortcomings of the TRC process. Even though they have their own problems 
stemming from the contexts of their historical and societal uniqueness, each case 
was criticized because it failed to develop sufficient mechanisms to promote 
participation. Criticisms ranged from questions of bias toward members of certain 
social groups to complaints of insufficient preparation for victim participation. 
The South African TRC failed to incorporate non-African individuals and non-
ANC supporters. The Sierra Leonean TRC was unable to reach individuals who 
lived in remote areas far from the capital. Moreover, many individuals distrusted 
foreigners in positions of authority. The Rwandan gacaca failed to invite non-
Tutsi individuals to become legitimate stakeholders in the process. Although 
non-Tutsi victims were allowed to participate, the conditions required for their 
participation were often formal and they perceived hidden agenda. Opportunities 
to commitment were limited and various restrictions were imposed on the victims’ 
provision of statements. These criticisms all contain a common motive: The need 
to create means to ensure that the greatest number of individuals can engage 
in the TJ process on their own initiative.
When a TJ program mobilizes one particular social group over others, its 
activities lose legitimacy because the process is associated with previous patterns 
of politicized injustice that relied on the justice system to eliminate political 
opposition (Dimitrijevic, 2008). Further, as illustrated by the Rwandan case, 
restricted participation in the process generates a new sense of alienation. If 
(foreign) experts express (legal) authority in a society that fails to secure the 
(sense of) rule of law, individuals may view the TJ programs as the playthings 
of foreigners/experts, as seen in the above Sierra Leonean case. In a society 
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where judicial authority is generally considered to be unfair, opportunities to 
publicly recognize victimhood are arguably implemented in the forms that may 
not be legally protected. The means to ensure that the greatest number of people 
can engage in the process on their own initiative is officially reflected in the 
principles of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Currently, outreach and the 
preparation of means for participation are considered essential elements of justice 
activities performed by the organization (International Criminal Court, 2006; 
Vinck & Pham, 2010: 423).
Yet, the means to ensure that the greatest number of people can engage in 
the process on their own initiative is a challenging matter even in a non-post-
conflict society focused on issues other than TJ. The processes involved in 
elections and religious practice in any country require mobilization. Robert 
Putnam’s notion of “social capital,” which is thought of as one of the social 
conditions for such mobilization, has declined in most countries (Putnam, 2000). 
As a matter of course, requests for local participation in TJ programs are met 
with reluctance in post-conflict countries, with people wondering, “What’s in it 
for us?”
However, organizations that manage TJ programs are not omnipotent. Facing 
scarce resources, limited time, and restricted mandates, the organizations are 
forced to prioritize their operations. Will victims agree with or will they be 
satisfied with the services/programmes provided in situations with scarce 
resources? Opportunities for locals to participate, rather than only to follow 
official decisions made by authoritative institutions, such as the courts, might 
answer that question. These opportunities can also be embodied in the manner 
in which a significant number of people share information in the public search 
for past truths. Thus, this author will submit that the mechanism to ensure that 
the greatest number of people can engage in the process based on their own 
initiative is a logical viewpoint for further argument on the possible role and 
legitimacy of TJ, when it is negatively identified with less than optimum 
conditions.
WHY  HAVE  TJS  CONSISTENTLY  RECEIVED  CRITICISM  AND
COMPLAINTS?  THE  SOCIAL  CONDITIONS  UNDER  WHICH  TJS  ARE
ESTABLISHED
An examination of why TJ programs have received so much criticism must 
consider the reasons why a society would establish a TJ program, such as that 
of an UN-led tribunal or the Truth Commission. The most likely answer is 
because domestic courts and national assemblies are unsuitable in light of 
neutrality, resource, and competence. Many societies lack the resources and 
experts to run their judicial system. Alternatively, citizens frequently distrust the 
judicial institutions and norms imposed by their country. Law was the primary 
tool used by the South African apartheid government to oppress Africans and 
create an unequal society. In Sierra Leone, although international judiciary was 
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used, some critics suspected the hybrid tribunal to be an American political 
process that reflected American needs. Thus, TJs are chosen, in part because the 
judicial systems in those societies are dysfunctional. However, the TJs themselves 
ultimately receive criticism, as discussed in previous section, that TJs do not 
bring justice. Both scholars and citizens have judged TJ programs as failures. 
Based on the African cases shown above, the criticisms are often related to 
problems with participation/mobilization such as, (1) insufficient attempts in 
contacting citizens during the process, (2) the TJ program not receiving the 
expected amount of attention, (3) frequent failure to include all social groups, 
and (4) the over-restriction in means of participation. These criticisms are 
persuasive because TJ programs were established to substitute for domestic 
judicial options in countries previously shown to lack legitimacy when addressing 
victimhood and wrongdoing. When the TJ program was not sufficiently publicized 
nor as accessible as the locals had expected, it was placed in the same 
disappointing category as prior unfair judicial courts or other official mechanisms.
Here “expectation” is the point of contention. A TJ is often criticized if it 
fails to mobilize local citizens as widely as expected. This said, what is the 
nature of “expectation” in this context?  In other words, what is the best measure 
of expected mobilization?
Perhaps the most desirable simulation would include the following scenario. 
Regardless of position, all members of the society would understand why the 
TJ program had been established. They would support the process and participate 
to the best of their ability in all activities. The call for participation would be 
viewed positively, and result in the birth of a new national identity. Only then 
would reconciliation occur among enemies through dialogue and mutual 
understanding among democratic citizens capable of seeking justice through 
judicial procedure. However, as Weinstein (2011: 3) pointed out, many of us 
presume that these expectations are hardly realized. 
Without doubt, TJ is a policy. A policy is normally proposed, discussed, and 
institutionalized through a scenario such as the one posed above. Any policy in 
a modern democratic society officially needs a logical/scientific ground and a 
perspective for the future outcome from implementing the policy. Therefore, 
when a government adopts a TJ option, the donors naturally demand a desirable 
cause-effect scenario. However, to understand the reason why past TJ projects 
have been described as failures that did not reach their expected goals, as 
exemplified by the South Africa and Sierra Leone cases, we must create an 
argument that can be developed outside the official explanations provided by TJ 
authorities. 
We must focus on the nature of the expectations expressed during the first 
stage of any TJ program. Although the discourse of expectation reflects, to a 
certain extent, the government’s self-legitimization, expectation involves a 
fundamental paradox, because at the same time, expectations reflect the ideas 
of citizens and individuals who enjoy public services in a relatively stable society. 
The views of a relatively stable society are shaped by indices such as the rule 
of law, governmental authority, and perceived legitimacy of policies, that the 
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countries that opt for TJ do not enjoy, which is why they adopt TJ programs. 
Political scholars, such as James Gibson, measure indices of TJ achievements 
such as “the strict application of the rule of law and commitment to legal 
universalism,” (Gibson, 2009: 176) and the recognition and acceptance of the 
authority of the major institutions of the new state (Gibson, 2004: 16–17) because 
those societies do not necessarily guarantee these factors. In other words, TJs 
are adopted because they operate in a special context that contains certain social 
and political conditions. However, citizen expectations of TJ outcomes are created 
by conditions that do not exist in post-conflict societies. Thus, the TJ program 
falls short of the expected goals. Under these circumstances, expectations of 
outcome may not be a suitable assessment for TJ effectiveness, and other 
approaches may better reflect the unique aspects of TJ.
SHOULD  TJS  BE  EVALUATED  BY  THE  EXTENT  TO  WHICH  THEY 
ACHIEVE  THEIR  EXPECTED  SCENARIO?
Here we consider the case of the South African TRC. The TRC offered the 
ideal of reconciliation. Thus, many scholars, journalists, and South African citizens 
questioned whether it had achieved or promoted the expected goal during or 
following completion of the project. As shown in previous section, the responses 
were primarily negative.
However, this author proposes viewing the principles involved in reconciliation 
from another perspective. According to political philosophy scholars, the 
theoretical approach to reconciliation does not necessarily assume a logical cause-
effect relationship. These scholars suggest that reconciliation may not be a 
planned goal but, rather, it may serve as a catalyst for new social effectiveness, 
such as the promotion of deliberative democracy. Erik Doxtader summed up this 
position quite simply:
I do not answer the question of whether reconciliation in South Africa 
‘worked’ … I suggest that this persistent question is very much the wrong 
question (Doxtader, 2009: 24). 
Rather than measuring the extent to which the TRC meets the expected goal, 
proponents of this theoretical approach focus on the new social relationships 
forged among former enemies and the rise of social reality. Doxtader has described 
a scenario in which “the words of reconciliation” served as a trigger to change 
the character of a relationship of conflict:
Appeals for reconciliation employed speech to create a time for speaking 
… a process of rhetorical invention that turned justifications for enmity 
into the potential for productive opposition (Doxtader, 2009: 288–289). 
In such a situation, “reconciliation provides a common vocabulary within which 
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citizens may contest the terms and possibility of their political association” 
(Schaap, 2005: 13). Here, we recognize a reversal of the usual usage of the 
word, “reconciliation.”
The South African TRC, as well as previous and subsequent TJ programs in 
other countries, did not set down a core definition of reconciliation, which 
allowed a diverse and continuing debate over the meaning and possible outcomes 
of reconciliation. Doxtader stated that “calls for reconciliation set language into 
the motion of speech” (Doxtader, 2009: 286), and even the lack of a shared 
understanding of reconciliation can create a space for “individual and collective 
(inter)action and productive (dis)agreements” (Doxtader, 2009: 20).
Most people have a tacit understanding of reconciliation or its ultimate outcome. 
Thus, they are likely to have a low expectation for projects in which the concept 
of reconciliation has not been formally defined (van der Merwe & Chapman, 
2008: 254) or, they criticize that the definition was incorrectly omitted (Duffy, 
2010: 34). Alternatively, others may focus on specific outcomes of a reconciliation 
program and disapprove of the program if it fails to achieve those goals (Weinstein, 
2011: 3).
The theoretical approach that examines how reconciliation dialogues and 
programs may change social circumstances assumes that social devices and 
assumptions for reconciliation function as catalysts for social change. Theorists 
who adhere to this catalyst approach evaluate the appearance of contestation 
around reconciliation as forming the deliberative democracy or democratic agon 
where the people are assumed to be a democratic subject (Norval, 2007: 200).
Furthermore, the social nature of information sharing, particularly the coverage 
provided by the media, can prepare people for productive contestation. South 
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) radio conducted on-the-spot 
broadcasting between 11 a.m. and 4 p.m. every day of the TRC public hearings. 
On-the-spot broadcasting with no editing or comment made the listeners feel as 
if they were present at the hearings. The SABC aired the programs in Zulu, 
Xhosa, Afrikaans, and English. SABC television aired daily news spots and the 
TRC Special Report, which ran on Sunday evenings from April 1996 to June 
1998. The producer explained the objective of the program as providing contextual 
understanding of each case, reflecting the local background in the footage, and 
critically examining the activities of the TRC. The TRC guaranteed SABC full 
editorial independence (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: 356). In all 
likelihood, the continuous and intense media coverage of TRC activities created 
an arena for individuals to engage in prolonged discussion. Given that the media 
tended to provide critical reports, it is likely that this agenda encouraged 
individuals to discuss controversial issues. Moreover, this social condition 
supported the assumption of the catalyst approach.
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A POLICY THAT OPERATES IN THE CONTEXT OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY: 
APPLYING THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT FRAMEWORK
I. Incorporating Unpredicted and Contingent Factors into Argument
Although proponents of the catalyst approach evaluate the success of TJ by 
the potential for social change generated by the process, critics who view TJ as 
a policy argue that the results should be assessed using concrete statistical 
standards. Thus, strict definitions of goals and key terms, such as justice and 
reconciliation, are required. The following quotation reflects this position:
... [T]ransitional justice mechanisms often lack clearly defined goals, which 
throws up obstacles for development evaluation. ... Being clear about what 
a transitional justice process is trying to achieve and how—what in 
evaluation theory and practice is known as a theory of change and in 
social science as a hypothesis—is the point of departure of any development 
evaluation (Duggan, 2010: 320).
However, these viewpoints do not consider the fact that the outcome of any 
policy may be affected by unknown, unpredicted, or unintended factors. In fact, 
the effect of unknown factors may be greater in post-conflict than in non-post-
conflict societies. Duggan (2010) described the features of TJ policy based on 
unavoidable contingencies rather than features of the programs:
Interviews with those involved in such commissions—commissioners, staff, 
witnesses, and victims—all attest to the fact that these processes never 
follow a linear pathway. They elicit unexpected and unanticipated 
divergences and upheavals, and they involve a high degree of creativity 
and constant adaptation of general principles from previous truth 
commissions to fit the new context (Duggan, 2010: 327).
The sociologist, Talcott Parsons, discussed the term, “double contingency,” in 
his social system theory (Parsons & Shils, 1951; Parsons, 1968). He explained 
that a fundamental contingency exists between actions and reactions in all 
relationships because the initial action expects a reaction. This said, the reaction 
cannot be foreseen. On the other hand, the reaction is contingent upon the action 
and yet, the reaction is theoretically open to several possible options. Therefore, 
the reaction occurs under contingent conditions. In his social system theory, 
Parsons stated that individuals rely on social norms when they make logical 
attempts to remedy this unstable condition (Parsons, 1968: 437). Social norms 
prevent people from becoming trapped in endless vacillation before they take 
action.
The TJ position, as well as individual reactions to TJ, can be compared to 
the so-called double contingency argument. The efficacy of a TJ program is 
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based on the anticipated achievement of outcomes, in the same manner as other 
policies. However, those expectations contain uncertainties (or more clearly, false 
logic) from the outset. False logic arises because TJ expectations are based on 
societies that have sufficient resources, satisfactory rule of law and social norms, 
and functional public services. In contrast, no shared codes/standards are available 
to moderate the reactions of locals in a new post-conflict society, because TJ is 
a new institution. According to Parsons, there are no social norms to guide the 
individual reactions to TJ and the values and goals of the process. Consequently, 
each person that is affected can only react based on his/her subjective interests. 
An individual who expects monetary reparations may be disappointed. People 
who believe that their victimization should be publicly addressed by the program 
may feel alienated. Victims who anticipate the perpetrators to show remorse may 
feel betrayed. Thus, in circumstances in which double contingency is relatively 
high, defining TJ goals according to the standards of a stable society undermines 
the unique contribution the TJ could make to a newly post-conflict society.
Now the author will discuss why TJ, conducted as a government policy, is 
often considered a failure, and the factors that make TJ unique in a post-conflict 
society. The following argument presents a new framework in which the author 
proposes that TJ be compared with social movements rather than classified as 
a policy, as used in non-post-conflict societies.
II. Using the Term, “Social Movement” in Our Model
Although various definitions of social movements exist, the widely accepted 
is, for instance, that of Tarrow (1998), who stated that social movements consist 
of “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in 
sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow, 1998: 4). 
However, there are more accommodating views of social movements that do not 
require the acquisition of social resources as a primary goal. In his study of 
ecology and peace movements, Alberto Melucci focused on “a transformation 
of the relations between society and its survival” (Melucci, 1996: 165). Movements 
should not be categorized primarily by the distribution of social resources or 
political or institutional reflections of the protesters’ appeals for rights. Melucci 
expressed these motives in the following manner: 
The problem raised by contemporary movements rather concerns a 
redefinition of what democracy is, can be, and ought to be in a world … 
where individuals and groups are offered the possibility of themselves 
constructing their identities instead of remaining simply recipients assigned 
them from the outside (Melucci, 1996: 203).
 This approach to a better understanding of contemporary social movements 
was extended by Koichi Hasegawa, who defined a social movement as “a 
transformation-oriented collective action, which derives from people’s discontent 
with the present conditions or certain prospective situations” (Hasegawa & 
17Traditional Justice Destined to Be Criticized as Failure
Machimura, 2004: 19). Although he emphasized three key terms, e.g., orientation 
toward transformation, collective actions, and discontent, Hasegawa omitted the 
terms contention, protest, and collective identity, from his definition.
The vector that extends the concept of social movement appears to parallel 
the changing status of authorities that are unstable in respect to mandate, 
legitimacy, durability, and the power to control social members in a rapidly 
changing world. Even though the context of each society is quite different from 
each other, unstable authority in the so-called postmodern world has some 
similarities to a post-conflict society. TJ is frequently adopted because it offers 
an alternative to de facto public services such as the provision of domestic 
courts in societies where governmental/public authority is unstable and does not 
yet enjoy local legitimacy.
However, social movements and TJ may be compared from another perspective. 
A social movement is roughly composed of two elements: (1) the desire to 
change a society through channels other than the institutional (e.g., a domestic 
judiciary or parliament) and (2) the effort to mobilize the greatest number of 
people. If a collective action lacks the former element, it will be subsumed in 
the normal work performed by political parties. If a collective action lacks the 
latter element, the movement is likely to only involve elite bureaucrats. In 
summary, although several definitions of social movements have been offered, 
our working definition has to be that a social movement is a “transformation-
oriented collective action” (Hasegawa & Machimura, 2004: 19) that includes a 
“redefinition of democracy” (Melucci, 1996: 203) through channels that differ 
from de facto judiciary and parliamentary channels that attempts to mobilize 
and involve the greatest number of people. This definition incorporates the 
elements that the African TJ programs have been accused of missing or of 
insufficiently including.
III. What Merit Can Be Derived from Comparing TJ and Social Movements?
The Campbell & Connolly’s study (2012) of Northern Ireland provides one 
of the few examples of research using social movement theory to analyze TJ. 
They applied the three main analytical frameworks of social movement theory, 
i.e., political opportunity structures, framing processes, and mobilizing theory, 
to interactions that occurred between Northern Ireland authorities and anti-
governmental forces. Political opportunity structure is a conceptual device used 
to identify structural factors that prepare and promote social movements. The 
framing process approach focuses on the ways social movement bodies assign 
meaning to their activities. The primary concerns of mobilizing theory are social 
movement leadership and the use of resources, including material resources such 
as fiscal and human networks that involve social capital.
Because TJ activities start without enough legitimate authority or lack 
acknowledgement by most citizens, the need to mobilize the greatest number of 
participants is similar to that of social movements. Therefore, the framing analysis 
approach and use of mobilizing theory are appropriate for assessing TJ. These 
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approaches weigh the dynamism of each program, mobilization procedure, and 
interaction that occurs between the TJ program and locals. TJ objectives, such 
as reconciliation and the achievement of mutual understanding among former 
enemies, are difficult to achieve within the short period of each TJ mandate. 
Approaches that use social movement theory are appropriate in these situations. 
If we focus on the negative political contexts that often affect TJ outcomes, 
political opportunity structures could serve as conceptual devices that may help 
researchers compare TJ projects based on well-defined measures.
Further, when we consider the aspects of social movements that attempt to 
change public meaning or negotiation procedures as shown in Melucci’s argument, 
changing spheres can be identified in the dissemination of collective actions 
among various actors. The South African Khulumani Support Group and Fambul 
Tok in Sierra Leone are examples of this point.
The South African TRC offered a space where participants could autonomously 
engage in the process because it used a loose definition of truth and reconciliation. 
The TRC did not serve as a repository for people’s memories. Shared memories 
and the provision of mutual assistance by survivors followed a path that neither 
the TRC nor the government could anticipate or control. For example, the 
Khulumani Support Group (khulumani, meaning to “speak out” in Zulu) began 
its work when the TRC was established and became the largest victims’ association 
in South Africa with more than 5,000 members. Initially, the Khulumani Support 
Group activities were aligned with the core agenda of the TRC, with activities 
including accessing information from the commission, creating proposals for 
victim reparations, and making public appeals related to amnesty judgments. 
However, their activities were not restricted to the framework of a lobbying 
organization for the TRC. The Khulumani Support Group was based on a strong 
bond with local communities and developed a role of its own. They staged a 
play that focused on the tension and contradiction in the TRC process and visited 
many townships. The Khulumani continued to follow the way the TRC related 
to its members, at the same time, they held symbolic funeral ceremonies for 
those who had died, whose remains had not been exhumed. 
In Daveyton, Reverend S. K. Mbande stated: 
The founders of Khulumani realize that the group never would have formed 
without the truth commission, though it has now taken on a life of its 
own (Hayner, 2001: 148).
Furthermore, the Reverend stated that these support groups were:
… one of the fruits of the commission. People coming together and healing 
themselves—that never would have happened before. Fear was the order 
of the day. Since the truth commission, things have come out, and it’s 
made people come together (Hayner, 2001: 148).
The TRC was an official body and, as such, it was required to be open to 
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all political groups, including groups engaged in conflicts with one another. Thus, 
the commission could not be expected to embody a space that was relatively 
closed and safe, or guarantee that communications would be secure. However, 
once the TRC was identified as an incomplete space, the need for an opposing 
space became clear. The Khulumani Support Group understood the people’s need 
for this type of space and developed its unique contribution. If the TRC had 
met all expectations and had been sufficiently helpful, organizations such as the 
Khulumani Support Group would not have emerged from the TRC’s process. 
The Khulumani case demonstrates that a TJ project may lay the groundwork 
for interactions among other groups and individuals who otherwise may not have 
become involved. Put another way, the TJ framework as a catalyst guarantees 
the recapture of data and facts that may have been categorized as nonessential 
in the official path to the publicly expected goal.
In sum, what merit can be derived from comparing TJ with social movements? 
The author proposes three possible directions for further argument. Firstly, TJ 
should not be identified as a policy. An expected goal will not be the ultimate 
standard for evaluation. Rather, the implementation process of TJ becomes the 
point of assessment particularly in terms of mobilizing locals and publishing 
program information. The analytical approaches in social movement theories are 
useful as practical analytical tools. How the TRC program can involve the 
politically opposing party will be a crucial question along this line. Secondly, 
recongnizing TJ is an insufficient and powerless organization from the beginning 
would further the argument that the deployment of connection, cooperation and 
networking with other organization becomes the next point to be assessed. The 
simple expressions, such as “the TRC failed” or “The court didn’t bring justice” 
are not persuasive from this viewpoint because TJ should rather be understood 
as a catalyst in a series of related issues. The author submits the case of the 
Khulumani Support Group in South Africa as an example of this viewpoint. 
Thirdly, this proposal requires new standards for evaluating the effectiveness of 
a TJ program. With the above definition of a social movement by Melucci 
(1996), a social movement seeks to nurture and change the public meaning of 
certain issues such as democracy, social justice and national identity. How can 
we recognize change in these aspects in a post-conflict society? How the 
effectiveness of TJ is properly evaluated is the very question for the current 
African societies whether each have or have not adopted TJ after political 
transitions. 
Scholars who study TJ frequently assert that TJ programs are not one-size-
fits-all. Consideration of the by-products of the mobilization process within the 
framework of social movement theory will enable researchers to recognize the 
unique aspects and complications of individual TJ cases. The author proposes a 
search for new measurement indices that are compatible with the societies 
concerned so that the analyses of critical discourses related to previous African 
TJ cases will lead to fresh potential directions for understanding post conflict 
societies. 
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NOTES
(1) In Mani (2007) cited by Colvin (2008: 415). Others proposed TJ as eight “separate but 
interrelated processes, of which some, if not all, are necessary to account for past 
wrongs: official acknowledgement of harms done; official apologies and other gestures; 
the promotion of public fact-finding or truth-telling fora, including a platform for 
victims and reparations or restitutions; justice in the form of trials or lustrations; the 
establishment of rule of law; public gestures of commemoration through the creation of 
monuments, memorials, and holidays, and other educational and cultural activities; 
institutional reform and long-term development; and public deliberation” (Crocker, 
1999: 60). Additionally, some scholars include impunity and grassroots conflict 
resolution in their definition of TJ (Thoms et al., 2010: 330–331).
(2) Public hearings comprised victim hearings, amnesty hearings, event hearings, special 
hearings, and institutional hearings. The two predominant hearings were the victim and 
amnesty hearings. Typically, there was no opportunity for dialogue between victim and 
perpetrator in the victim hearings. Each witness was allowed a 30-minute testimony in 
a question-answer format in hearings led by TRC commissioners. Victim hearings were 
held at 63 venues around the country for three or four days at each venue.
(3) For more on insufficient implementation of TRC recommendations for reparation, see 
Backer (2010: 447) and Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998: 184–187).
(4) However, Thulani Grenville-Gray, a South African psychologist, insists that re-
traumatization itself is not necessarily fatal or completely wrong for mental recovery 
(Hayner, 2001: 144).
(5) When members of the local non-elite heard that the TRC was coming to help them, 
they expected no less than the provision of money and resources, not sometime in the 
future but right now. Most of the local non-elite believed that the TRC would provide 
money in direct exchange for the telling of victim or witness stories. Fanta, a 60-year-
old Limba woman I met at the Panlap amputee camp outside Makeni, stated plainly 
that ‘they said if we go and talk, they will help us.’ Fanta was one of two people I 
interviewed who had told their stories at the TRC hearing in Makeni. She had done so 
only because, as she said, ‘I thought they will help me for daily bread and medical’ 
(Millar, 2010: 491).
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